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Bayes, Jeffreys, Prior Distributions and
the Philosophy of Statistics1
Andrew Gelman
I actually own a copy of Harold Jeffreys’s The-
ory of Probability but have only read small bits of
it, most recently over a decade ago to confirm that,
indeed, Jeffreys was not too proud to use a classi-
cal chi-squared p-value when he wanted to check the
misfit of a model to data (Gelman, Meng and Stern,
2006). I do, however, feel that it is important to un-
derstand where our probability models come from,
and I welcome the opportunity to use the present ar-
ticle by Robert, Chopin and Rousseau as a platform
for further discussion of foundational issues.2
In this brief discussion I will argue the follow-
ing: (1) in thinking about prior distributions, we
should go beyond Jeffreys’s principles and move to-
ward weakly informative priors; (2) it is natural for
those of us who work in social and computational
sciences to favor complex models, contra Jeffreys’s
preference for simplicity; and (3) a key generaliza-
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1Discussion of “Harold Jeffreys’s Theory of Probability re-
visited,” by Christian Robert, Nicolas Chopin, and Judith
Rousseau, for Statistical Science.
This is an electronic reprint of the original article
published by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics in
Statistical Science, 2009, Vol. 24, No. 2, 176–178. This
reprint differs from the original in pagination and
typographic detail.
2On the topic of other books on the foundations of Bayesian
statistics, I confess to having found Savage (1954) to be nearly
unreadable, a book too much of a product of its time in its
enthusiasm for game theory as a solution to all problems, an
attitude which I find charming in the classic work of Luce and
Raiffa (1957) but more of annoyance in a book of statistical
methods. When it comes to Cold War-era foundational work
on Bayesian statistics, I much prefer the work of Lindley, in
his 1965 book and elsewhere.
Also, I would be disloyal to my coauthors if I did not report
that, despite what is said in the second footnote in the arti-
cle under discussion, there is at least one other foundational
Bayesian text of 1990s vintage that continues to receive more
citations than Jeffreys.
tion of Jeffreys’s ideas is to explicitly include model
checking in the process of data analysis.
THE ROLE OF THE PRIOR DISTRIBUTION
IN BAYESIAN DATA ANALYSIS
At least in the field of statistics, Jeffreys is best
known for his eponymous prior distribution and,
more generally, for the principle of constructing non-
informative, or minimally informative, or objective,
or reference prior distributions from the likelihood
(see, for example, Kass and Wasserman, 1996). But
it can notoriously difficult to choose among nonin-
formative priors; and, even more importantly, seem-
ingly noninformative distributions can sometimes have
strong and undesirable implications, as I have found
in my own experience (Gelman, 1996, 2006). As a re-
sult I have become a convert to the cause of weakly
informative priors, which attempt to let the data
speak while being strong enough to exclude vari-
ous “unphysical” possibilities which, if not blocked,
can take over a posterior distribution in settings
with sparse data—a situation which is increasingly
present as we continue to develop the techniques of
working with complex hierarchical and nonparamet-
ric models.
HOW THE SOCIAL AND COMPUTATIONAL
SCIENCES DIFFER FROM PHYSICS
Robert, Chopin and Rousseau trace the applica-
tion of Ockham’s razor (the preference for simpler
models) from Jeffreys’s discussion of the law of grav-
ity through later work of a mathematical statisti-
cian (Jim Berger), an astronomer (Bill Jefferys) and
a physicist (David MacKay). From their perspec-
tive, Ockham’s razor seems unquestionably reason-
able, with the only point of debate being the extent
to which Bayesian inference automatically encom-
passes it.
My own perspective as a social scientist is com-
pletely different. I’ve just about never heard some-
one in social science object to the inclusion of a
variable or an interaction in a model; rather, the
1
2 A. GELMAN
most serious criticisms of a model involve worries
that certain potentially important factors have not
been included. In the social science problems I’ve
seen, Ockham’s razor is at best an irrelevance and
at worse can lead to acceptance of models that are
missing key features that the data could actually
provide information on. As such, I am no fan of
methods such as BIC that attempt to justify the
use of simple models that do not fit observed data.
Don’t get me wrong—all the time I use simple mod-
els that don’t fit the data—but no amount of BIC
will make me feel good about it!3
I much prefer Radford Neal’s line from his Ph.D.
thesis:
Sometimes a simple model will outperform
a more complex model. . . Nevertheless, I
[Neal] believe that deliberately limiting the
complexity of the model is not fruitful when
the problem is evidently complex. Instead,
if a simple model is found that outper-
forms some particular complex model, the
appropriate response is to define a differ-
ent complex model that captures what-
ever aspect of the problem led to the sim-
ple model performing well.
This is not really a Bayesian or a non-Bayesian
issue: complicated models with virtually unlimited
nonlinearity and interactions are being developed
using Bayesian principles. See, for example, Dun-
son (2006) and Chipman, George and McCulloch
(2008). To put it another way, you can be a prac-
ticing Bayesian and prefer simpler models, or be a
practicing Bayesian and prefer complicated models.
Or you can follow similar inclinations toward sim-
plicity or complexity from various non-Bayesian per-
spectives.
My point here is only that the Ockhamite tenden-
cies of Jeffreys and his followers up to and includ-
ing MacKay may derive, to some extent, from the
simplicity of the best models of physics, the sense
that good science moves from the particular to the
general—an attitude that does not fit in so well with
modern social and computational science.
3See Gelman and Rubin (1995) for a fuller expression of this
position, and Raftery (1995) for a defense of BIC in general
and in the context of two applications in sociology.
BAYESIAN INFERENCE VS. BAYESIAN DATA
ANALYSIS
One of my own epiphanies—actually stimulated
by the writings of E. T. Jaynes, yet another Bayesian
physicist—and incorporated into the title of my own
book on Bayesian statistics, is that sometimes the
most important thing to come out of an inference is
the rejection of the model on which it is based. Data
analysis includes model building and criticism, not
merely inference. Only through careful model build-
ing is such definitive rejection possible. This idea—
the comparison of predictive inferences to data—
was forcefully put into Bayesian terms nearly thirty
years ago by Box (1980) and Rubin (1984) but is
even now still only gradually becoming standard in
Bayesian practice.
A famous empiricist once said, “With great power
comes great responsibility.” In Bayesian terms, the
stronger we make our model—following the excellent
precepts of Jeffreys and Jaynes—the more able we
will be to find the model’s flaws and thus perform
scientific learning.
To roughly translate into philosophy-of-science jar-
gon: Bayesian inference within a model is “normal
science,” and “scientific revolution” is the process of
checking a model, seeing its mismatches with reality,
and coming up with a replacement. The revolution
is the glamour boy in this scenario, but, as Kuhn
(1962) emphasized, it is only the careful work of nor-
mal science that makes the revolution possible: the
better we can work out the implications of a theory,
the more effectively we can find its flaws and thus
learn about nature.4 In this chicken-and-egg process,
both normal science (Bayesian inference) and revo-
lution (Bayesian model revision) are useful, and they
feed upon each other. It is in this sense that graph-
ical methods and exploratory data analysis can be
viewed as explicitly Bayesian, as tools for comparing
posterior predictions to data (Gelman, 2003).
To get back to the Robert, Chopin, and Rousseau
article: I am suggesting that their identification (and
Jeffreys’s) of Bayesian data analysis with Bayesian
inference is limiting and, in practice, puts an unre-
alistic burden on any model.
4As Kuhn may very well have written had he lived long
enough, scientific progress is fractal, with episodes of nor-
mal science and mini-revolutions happening over the period
of minutes, hours, days, and years, as well as the more familiar
examples of paradigms lasting over decades or centuries.
COMMENT 3
CONCLUSION
If you wanted to do foundational research in statis-
tics in the mid-twentieth century, you had to be bit
of a mathematician, whether you wanted to or not.
As Robert, Chopin, and Rousseau’s own work re-
veals, if you want to do statistical research at the
turn of the twenty-first century, you have to be a
computer programmer.
The present discussion is fascinating in the way it
reveals how many of our currently unresolved issues
in Bayesian statistics were considered with sophisti-
cation by Jeffreys. It is certainly no criticism of his
pioneering work that it has been a springboard for
decades of development, most notably (in my opin-
ion) involving the routine use of hierarchical models
of potentially unlimited complexity, and with the
recognition that much can be learned by both the
successes and the failures of a statistical model’s at-
tempt to capture reality. The Bayesian ideas of Jef-
freys, de Finetti, Lindley, and others have been cen-
tral to the shift in focus away from simply modeling
data collection and toward the modeling of underly-
ing processes of interest—“prior distributions,” one
might say.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Hal Stern for helpful comments and the
National Science Foundation for partial support of
this research.
REFERENCES
Belin, T. R., Diffendal, G. J., Mack, S., Rubin, D. B.,
Schafer, J. L. and Zaslavsky, A. M. (1993). Hierarchi-
cal logistic regression models for imputation of unresolved
enumeration status in undercount estimation (with discus-
sion). J. Amer. Statist. Assoc. 88 1149–1166.
Box, G. E. P. (1980). Sampling and Bayes inference in sci-
entific modelling and robustness. J. Roy. Statist. Soc. Ser.
A 143 383–430. MR0603745
Chipman, H. A., George, E. I. and McCulloch, R. E.
(2008). Bayesian additive regression trees. Technical re-
port.
de Finetti, B. (1974, 1975). Theory of Probability. Wiley,
New York.
Dunson, D. B. (2006). Bayesian dynamic modeling of latent
trait distributions. Biostatistics 7 551–568.
Gelman, A. (1996). Bayesian model building by pure
thought. Some principals and examples. Statist. Sinica 6
215–232. MR1379058
Gelman, A. (2003). A Bayesian formulation of exploratory
data analysis and goodness-of-fit testing. Internat. Statist.
Rev. 71 369–382.
Gelman, A. (2006). Prior distributions for variance param-
eters in hierarchical models. Bayesian Anal. 1 515–533.
MR2221284
Gelman, A., Carlin, J. B., Stern, H. S. and Rubin, D.
B. (1995). Bayesian Data Analysis. Chapman and Hall,
London. MR1385925
Gelman, A., Jakulin, A., Pittau, M. G. and Su, Y. S.
(2008). A weakly informative default prior distribution for
logistic and other regression models. Ann. Appl. Statist. 2
1360–1383.
Gelman, A., Meng, X. L. and Stern, H. S. (1996). Pos-
terior predictive assessment of model fitness via realized
discrepancies (with discussion). Statist. Sinica 6 733–807.
MR1422404
Gelman, A. and Rubin, D. B. (1995). Avoiding model se-
lection in Bayesian social research. Discussion of “Bayesian
model selection in social research,” by A. E. Raftery. In So-
ciological Methodology 1995 (P. V. Marsden, ed.) 165–173.
American Sociological Association, Washington, DC.
Jaynes, E. T. (1983). Papers on Probability, Statistics, and
Statistical Physics (R. D. Rosenkrantz, ed.). Reidel, Dor-
drecht. MR0786828
Jefferys, W. H. and Berger, J. O. (1992). Occam’s ra-
zor and Bayesian analysis. Amer. Sci. 80 65–72. (Erratum:
Amer. Sci. 80 116.)
Jeffreys, H. (1961). Theory of Probability, 3rd ed. Oxford
Univ. Press. MR0187257
Kass, R. E. and Wasserman, L. (1996). The selection of
prior distributions by formal rules. J. Amer. Statist. Assoc.
91 1343–1370. MR1478684
Kuhn, T. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
MIT Press, Cambridge.
Lindley, D. V. (1958). Fiducial distributions and Bayes’ the-
orem. J. Roy. Statist. Soc. Ser. B 20 102–107. MR0095550
Lindley, D. V. (1965). Introduction to Probability and Statis-
tics from a Bayesian Viewpoint. Cambridge Univ. Press.
Luce, R. D. and Raiffa, H. (1957). Games and Decisions.
Wiley, New York.
MacKay, D. J. C. (2002). Information Theory, Inference and
Learning Algorithms. Cambridge Univ. Press. MR2012999
Neal, R. M. (1996). Bayesian Learning for Neural Networks.
Springer, New York.
Raftery, A. E. (1995). Bayesian model selection in social re-
search (with discussion). In Sociological Methodology 1995
(P. V. Marsden, ed.) 111–163. American Sociological Asso-
ciation, Washington, DC.
Rubin, D. B. (1984). Bayesianly justifiable and relevant
frequency calculations for the applied statistician. Ann.
Statist. 12 1151–1172. MR0760681
Savage, L. J. (1954). Foundations of Statistical Inference.
Wiley, New York. MR0063582
